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Asset Securitizations and Credit Default Swaps 
 
ABSTRACT: This study examines the effects of off-balance sheet 
versus on-balance sheet securitizations on the originator’s credit risk in the 
default swap (CDS) market across the recent business cycle from 2002 to 
2009. I find that on-balance sheet securitizations demonstrate greater 
effects on the originator’s CDS premium than off-balance sheet 
securitizations in the business cycle. While off-balance sheet 
securitizations’ effects on the originator’s CDS premium become 
significantly stronger after 2007 when the economy declines, on-balance 
sheet securitizations’ effects on the originator’s CDS premium do not 
experience a significant change with the onset of the recession. The results 
suggest that the CDS market views originators as having greater 
probabilities not to honour their implicit guarantees for off-balance sheet 
securitizations during the economic downturn. The results also indicate that 
on balance sheet and off-balance sheet securitizations have distinctly 
different risk properties. It would be beneficial to investors if regulations 
take into considerations the changing credit risks of off-balance sheet 
securitizations and the different structures of asset securitizations.   
 
  
2 
 
1 Introduction 
Under both IFRS and US GAAP, asset securitizations can be 
structured as sales and therefore are off the balance sheet (i.e. off-balance 
sheet securitizations). Asset securitizations not structured as sales are 
recognized on the balance sheet as secured borrowings (i.e. on-balance 
sheet securitizations). The objective of this study is to examine the effects 
of these two types of asset securitizations on the originator’s CDS 
premium. 
Setting an appropriate regulatory framework for asset 
securitizations continues to be at the centre of financial reporting debate 
among policy makers and regulators. The debate hinges on how to 
accurately capture the levels of credit risk in asset securitizations (Barth et 
al. 2012; Cheng et al. 2011). For example, the Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision proposes to impose different capital requirements for 
asset securitizations with different structures and credit risk properties. The 
Basel Committee is concerned that the capital requirement may have been 
too high for some types of securitizations while too low for the others 
(Basel Committee 2012). Therefore, investigating the credit risk of off-
balance sheet and on-balance sheet securitizations provides useful insight in 
how to set appropriate regulatory requirements for different types of asset 
securitizations. 
Although prior research has examined various aspects of off-
balance sheet securitizations (Niu and Richardson 2006; Chen et al. 2008; 
Landsman et al. 2008; Dechow and Shakespeare 2009; Cheng et al. 2011; 
Barth et al. 2012), empirical evidence is scarce on the implications of asset 
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securitizations with different structures. In particular, little is known about 
on-balance sheet securitizations. Furthermore, prior research to date has 
examined the risk of asset securitizations using stock returns, bond yields 
and credit ratings. Compared with these measures, the CDS premium is a 
more direct measure of credit risk and the CDS market is a better venue to 
investigate credit risk than equity and bond markets (Hull et al. 2004; 
Callen et al. 2009). This study therefore addresses the gap in the literature 
by investigating: ‘What are the effects of off-balance sheet and on-balance 
sheet securitizations on the investor’s assessment of the originator’s credit 
risk in the CDS market?’ 
 To shed light on the above question, this study compares the 
associations of off-balance sheet and on-balance sheet securitizations with 
the CDS premium referenced to the originator. After searching the Edgar 
database, this study identifies a sample of 113 US securitizing firms with 
available data to run the tests across the latest business cycle (2002-09). 
The investigation of the relation between the CDS premium and the value 
of the securitized assets extends the CDS pricing model in Callen et al. 
(2009). As noted by Allen and Bali (2007), the neglect of the cyclicality in 
the macroeconomy can lead to fundamental flaws in the measurement of 
credit risk. Hence, the association with the CDS premium is examined 
through the latest business cycle (2002−2009). To detect material 
adjustments in this relation, this relation is examined before and after the 
start of the financial crisis (hereafter ‘before 2007’ and ‘after 2007’),1 
                                                 
1
 The latest business cycle starts from 2002 and ends in 2009 (NBER, Business Cycle Dating 
Committee), which is hallmarked by a flourishing securitization market. SFAS 140 (FASB 
2000) governed the accounting disclosures of securitizations during this time. Year 2007 is 
included in ‘after 2007’. 
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which is considered a turning point in economic activity for the latest 
business cycle.
2
 
I find that on-balance sheet securitizations have stronger effects on 
the originator’s CDS premium than off-balance sheet securitizations in the 
business cycle. Off-balance sheet securitizations’ effects on the originator’s 
CDS premium become significantly stronger after 2007 when the economy 
declines. By contrast, on-balance sheet securitizations’ effects on the 
originator’s CDS premium do not experience a significant change with the 
onset of the recession. Compared with prior research in the equity and bond 
markets (Nui and Richardson 2006; Chen et al. 2008; Barth et al. 2010), 
this study provides different evidence from the CDS market. Prior research 
generally finds that off-balance sheet securitizations are risk relevant prior 
to the financial crisis, while this study finds that off-balance sheet 
securitizations have strong effects on the originator’s CDS premium after 
the financial crisis.  
The CDS market provides a better venue to examine credit risk 
associated with asset securitizations than equity and bond markets. The 
premium on a CDS contract is the product of the expected probability of 
default times the expected loss. The greater is the originator’s obligation, 
the greater is the probability of default. For expected losses, the priority of 
claims matters. As the originator is not legally responsible for off-balance 
sheet securitizations, they should only count after all other debts have been 
paid off and will not be counted at all in bankruptcy. Prior research drawing 
                                                 
2
 US Federal Reserve’s Financial Crisis Timeline (Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis 2010) is 
drawn on to estimate the onset of the financial crisis and the general deterioration of credit 
conditions in the economy. This timeline identifies that the financial crisis started from 2007. 
The trend in credit conditions can also be observed in the significant rise of the sample 
average CDS premium entering into 2007 as shown in Figure 1. 
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evidence from the equity market studies the residual claimant, which is 
ranked behind everyone else. Prior research also draws evidence from the 
bond market, where most issued bonds are secured. Evidence from these 
markets is less sensitive to the changes in credit risk. Therefore, the CDS 
market, which is highly sensitive to the changes in credit risk, provides 
unique evidence on credit risk of asset securitizations.  
As suggested by the financial instability theory (Minsky 1970, 
1982, 1995), in the benign economic conditions before the financial crisis, 
the CDS market views any loss from off-balance sheet securitizations as 
being fully covered by the implicit guarantees provided by the originator. 
After the financial crisis, the CDS market reassesses the credit risk with the 
views that the originator might not fully honour its implicit guarantees due 
to significantly increased losses associated with off-balance sheet 
securitizations. This explains why off-balance sheet securitizations may 
have stronger effects on the originator’s CDS premium after the crisis. By 
comparison, on-balance sheet securitizations fully remain the originator’s 
secured liabilities. There is little uncertainty about whether the originator 
would honour its guarantees.   
The evidence provided in this paper has regulatory implications. 
The results suggest that the CDS market views originators as having greater 
probabilities not to honour on their implicit guarantees for off-balance sheet 
securitizations after 2007. The evidence also indicates the different risk 
properties of off-balance sheet and on-balance sheet securitizations. 
Therefore it would be beneficial to investors if regulations take into 
considerations the changing credit risks in off-balance sheet securitizations 
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and differentiate regulatory requirements for these two types of asset 
securitizations. Additionally, by documenting the effects of asset 
securitizations with different structures on the originator’s CDS premium 
before and after the recent financial crisis, I contribute to the literature on 
the effects of information uncertainty on asset prices.  
This study is organized as follows. Section 2 provides background 
on the institutional setting and reviews prior research related to accounting 
for securitizations. Section 3 develops hypotheses based on theory and 
prior research. Section 4 and 5 describe the model and the sample. Section 
6 presents the empirical results. Section 7 discusses sensitivity analyses. 
Section 8 concludes the paper. 
  
7 
 
2 Institutional Background and Prior Research 
Asset Securitizations 
Asset securitizations are often called ‘shadow banking’, as they 
provide vital financing resources to firms at lower costs than the traditional 
banking. According to the Securities Industry and Financial Markets 
Association (SIFMA), the outstanding amount of global asset 
securitizations stands above $13 trillion in 2010.   
Asset securitizations can be largely categorized into off-balance 
sheet and on-balance sheet securitizations. Although the majority of the 
originators engaged in off-balance sheet securitizations, there have been 
firms only having on-balance sheet securitizations. Since the financial crisis 
in 2007-2008, large amounts of off-balance sheet securitizations were 
brought onto the balance sheet as the market of mortgage backed securities 
(MBSs) collapsed.
3
 
Off-balance sheet securitizations treat the securitized assets as being 
sold to investors, while retaining some percentage of the securitized assets 
(i.e. retained interests) on the balance sheet to cover losses in the 
securitized asset pools. Legally, the originator is not responsible for any 
losses beyond the retained interests. However, the originator often provides 
implicit guarantees to investors.  
Implicit guarantee or recourse is voluntary in the sense that it is not 
legally binding for the originator to take on implicit obligations not 
mandated in contracts. In theory, the existence of the implicit recourse can 
                                                 
3
 For example, Bank of America, Legg Mason, SEI Investment Co., Sun Trust Banks Inc., 
Merrill Lynch, and Citigroup have all pumped cash into their off-balance sheet vehicles to 
provide enhancements to the trusts (‘Bank of America, Legg Mason Prop Up Their Money 
Funds’, Bloomberg.com, November 2007). 
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be explained from two perspectives. Ex ante, the implicit recourse is 
essential to assure the bankruptcy remoteness of SPEs (Landsman et al. 
2008), thus reducing the bankruptcy costs in the transaction. Without the 
implicit recourse, investors would charge higher interests on lending in case 
the thinly capitalized SPEs might face liquidity shortages or other financial 
difficulties. It is the bottom line guarantee provided to investors by 
originators. Ex post, the implicit recourse reflects the originators’ concerns 
about their future access to the capital market if they let their SPEs 
collapse. As witnessed in the financial crisis, many originators voluntarily 
repurchased securitized assets from, or extended credit to, securitization 
vehicles, even if they did not have contractual obligations to do so.
4
 By 
providing such implicit guarantees to the investors, the originator intends to 
protect its own reputation capital (Gorton and Pennacchi 1995). 
By contrast, on-balance sheet securitizations do not retain any first 
loss positions in securitized assets. On-balance sheet securitizations treat 
the whole of the securitized assets as the originator’s liabilities and 
continue to keep the whole of securitized assets on the balance sheet (i.e. 
there is no retained interests). Investors have explicit recourse to the 
originator’s assets for their losses related with the securitized assets. 
Because of this crucial difference in the structures, off-balance sheet and 
on-balance sheet securitizations may contain different risk properties.   
  
Prior Research 
                                                 
4
 For example, Bank of America, Legg Mason, SEI Investment Co., Sun Trust Banks Inc., 
Merrill Lynch, and Citigroup have all pumped cash into their off-balance sheet vehicles to 
provide enhancements to the trusts (‘Bank of America, Legg Mason Prop Up Their Money 
Funds’, Bloomberg.com, November 2007). 
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Early research found that asset securitizations increase bank profit 
by widening investment channels and therefore either decreases risk 
(Greenbaum and Thakor 1987; James 1988; Lockwood et al. 1996) or has 
little impact on the originator’s risk (James 1987; Pavel 1989; Hasan 1993). 
Recent literature focuses on the leverage-increasing effects of securitization 
and concludes that there is a positive relation between securitization and 
risk. Barth et al. (2010) examine the sources of the credit risk in off-balance 
sheet securitizations and find that retained interests and securitized assets 
are valued differently between the bond market and credit rating agencies. 
Cheng et al. (2011) find that asset securitizations increase banks’ 
information uncertainty. Amiram et al. (2012) find that equity market reacts 
more to the impairment of retained interests after the financial cisis, 
suggesting information uncertainty at the risk assessment of asset 
securitizations during the crisis. This study extends the current literature on 
asset securitizations by measuring the credit risk associated with both off-
balance sheet and on-balance sheet securitizations. Moreover, credit risk is 
measured by the pure credit risk pricing instrument of the CDS. 
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3 Hypotheses 
Securitization, Leverage and the CDS Premium 
Research into securitization finds that off-balance sheet 
securitization is a borrowing rather than a sale by the originator (Niu and 
Richardson, 2006; Landsman et al., 2008). If securitization is a borrowing, 
then securitization increases the leverage of the originator. It is well known 
that a boost in leverage increases the firm’s credit risk (Merton, 1974; 
Callen et al., 2009; Ericsson et al., 2009). It is therefore predicted, as a 
maintained hypothesis, that securitization (both on and off-balance sheet) 
has a positive association with the originator’s credit risk. Using the CDS 
premium to measure credit risk, this leads to the first hypothesis: 
H1: The CDS premium of the originator is positively associated 
with asset securitizations. 
 
Off-Balance Sheet Securitization and the CDS Premium 
Economic fluctuations impact credit risk. For example, Fisher 
(1933) proposed that excessive borrowings depress asset price, increase 
default and cause recession. Minsky (1964, 1970, 1982, 1995) developed 
the theory of financial instability. According to Minsky, economic 
fluctuations originate from the interactions between income, debt and asset 
price. In a period of economic growth, there appear new opportunities of 
profitable investments. Entities start to borrow to fund the new investment 
in pursuit of higher profits. Expansions of investment push asset prices 
higher. However, the increase in debt will be faster than the increase in 
income. At the same time, increased competition in the market attenuates 
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the profitability of new investments. Decreased income will adversely 
impact asset price and lowers the ability of entities to repay debt. 
Refinancing then becomes difficult. To repay their debts, entities need to 
sell their extant assets. If many entities try to sell their assets to deleverage 
at the same time, the asset price will be depressed and the default rate rises. 
Consistent with economic theory, there will be little risk in 
securitized assets during economic growth. The market believes that any 
loss from securitized assets in off-balance sheet SPEs can be fully covered 
by the implicit recourse provided by the originator in the benign economic 
conditions before the financial crisis. However, cash flows from securitized 
assets will become unstable during recessions. This instability may burgeon 
from falling income or deteriorating credit conditions. Consequently, 
investors view that the originator will not be able to honour fully its 
obligations to off-balance sheet SPEs due to significantly increased losses 
associated with the SPEs after the financial crisis. 
The watershed in the latest business cycle comes at the beginning of 
2007, the start of the financial crisis (Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis 
2010). Therefore, it is predicted that off-balance sheet securitization’s 
association with the originator’s CDS premium rises after 2007. This leads 
to the second hypothesis: 
H2: The CDS premium of the originator is more positively 
associated with off-balance sheet securitization after 2007 than prior to 
2007. 
 
On-Balance Sheet Securitization and the CDS Premium 
12 
 
In order to obtain the most favourable financing terms, the deal 
structures of securitization transactions sometimes will not be able to meet 
the regulatory requirements of true sales. Unlike off-balance sheet 
securitizations, these on-balance sheet securitizations remain the 
originator’s liabilities and investors have full recourse for their losses. The 
deal structures that do not qualify as sales include the originator’s right of 
remarketing of the securitized assets, holding unconditional call options on 
the securitized assets
5
 and entering into derivatives to hedge interest rate 
exposure of securitized assets.
6
 Under such deal structures, the originator 
still effectively controls the securitized assets and a true sale cannot be 
accomplished.  
In general, on-balance sheet securitization would have greater 
effects on the originator’s CDS premium than off-balance sheet 
securitization, as investors view on-balance sheet securitization as 
transferring minimum credit risk to the SPEs. The whole of securitized 
assets in on-balance sheet securitizations continue to be kept on the 
originator’s balance sheet. Investors have full explicit recourse to the 
originator’s assets to cover any losses from on-balance sheet 
securitizations. This leads to the hypothesis 3a: 
H3a: The CDS premium of the originator is more highly associated 
with on-balance sheet securitization than with off-balance sheet 
securitization. 
                                                 
5
 For example, see page 93 of the SEC10-K filing of SLM Corporation for the fiscal year 
ended December 31, 2006. 
6
 For example, see Note 8 of the SEC10-K filing of Wyndham Worldwide Corporation for the 
fiscal year ended December 31, 2007. 
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When the economy declines, the likelihood of providing recourse to 
deficient SPEs by the originator would still be greater for on-balance sheet 
securitization than for off-balance sheet securitization, as on-balance sheet 
securitization remains fully the originator’s liabilities. This greater 
likelihood of recourse would be viewed favourably by the CDS market and 
translated into smaller increases in the CDS premium. This leads to the 
hypothesis 3b: 
H3b: The increase in the association of on-balance sheet 
securitization with the CDS premium of the originator is smaller than off-
balance sheet securitization after 2007. 
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4 Research Design 
Callen et al. (2009) model the firm-level CDS premium as a 
function of income, leverage, interest rate, asset volatility, firm size and 
credit ratings. To answer the research question, this study extends Callen et 
al.’s (2009) model to include on-balance sheet and off-balance sheet 
securitizations. To test the fluctuation in the association between 
securitization and credit risk across the business cycle, a recession 
interaction term R is further added to the model. R is an indicator variable 
with 1 if the observation is after 1 January 2007 and 0 otherwise.
7
 The 
extended model is: 
0 1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8 9 10
11 12 13
* *
_ (1)
it it it it it
it it it it it
it it j j it it
CDS R OffBS OffBS R OnBS OnBS R
AROA OLEV CRT SDRT SIZE
SPOT DOC D m Ind
     
    
    
     
    
     
 
Where: 
CDS  = natural log of the CDS premium (in basis points); 
R  = indicator variable with 1 if the observation of CDS spread 
is after 1st January 2007 and 0 otherwise;  
OffBS  = outstanding dollar amount of financial assets securitized 
accounted for as sales less retained interests and servicing 
rights deflated by the sum of market value of equity and 
total liabilities of the firm;  
OnBS  = outstanding dollar amount of financial assets securitized 
accounted for as secured borrowings deflated by the sum of 
market value of equity and total liabilities of the firm; 
AROA  = net income before extraordinary items less securitization 
gains scaled by the sum of market value of equity and total 
                                                 
7
 Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis’s The Financial Crisis: A Timeline of Events and Policy 
Actions (Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis 2010) starts from February 2007 when Freddie 
Mac stops buying risky subprime mortgage loans. Here it is advanced to 1 January 2007 to 
capture the sensitivity of the credit market. Whether cut in February or January 2007 does not 
have any significant impact on the results. There are only three CDS observations in January 
2007 in the final sample. 
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liabilities of the firm; 
OLEV  = total liabilities minus the on-balance sheet securitization 
deflated by the sum of market value of equity and total 
liabilities of the firm; 
CRT  = Standard & Poor (S&P)’s long-term credit rating; 
SDRT  = standard deviation of daily returns during the current fiscal 
quarter ; 
SIZE  = natural log of the market value of equity at the end of fiscal 
quarter; 
SPOT  = one-year US T-bill rate; 
DOC = indicator variable with 1 if the CDS contract has ‘exclude 
restructuring’ clause and 0 otherwise; 
D_m = 1 (0) if the CDS contract maturity is (is not) m years, 
m=3,5,7,10; 
∑jInd = 1 (0) if a firm is (is not) in industry j, based on the 1-digit 
SIC codes;  
i  = firm subscript; 
t  = time subscript for quarter t. 
 
Dependent Variable 
The dependent variable (CDS) is the composite average CDS 
premium
8
 written on the originator observed one day after the firm’s SEC 
filing date. The composite CDS premium indicates the price of the credit 
risk of the entity rather than a particular debt issued by the entity (Callen et 
al. 2009; Ericsson et al. 2009).
9
 
 
Independent Variables 
                                                 
8
 The Markit CDS premium data come from the book of trading records (daily closing price) 
or the most recent executable bid/offers if transaction record is unavailable. Markit CDS 
premium is a composite calculated as the average of the market CDS prices on the same entity 
contributed by multiple brokers and dealers. The Markit CDS data require at least three 
market prices to calculate the composite average. 
9
 Naked CDS constitutes most of the CDS market. Naked CDS investors buy and sell 
protections without owning any debt issued by the reference entity. Naked CDS is estimated 
to account for 80 per cent of the CDS market (‘Banning “Naked” Default Swaps May Raise 
Corporate Funding Costs’, Bloomberg.com, July 2009). 
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The independent variables are on-balance sheet securitization 
(OnBS) and off-balance sheet securitization (OffBS). They are the book 
values of the amount of the firm’s securitized financial assets (Niu and 
Richardson 2006; Landsman et al. 2008; Chen et al. 2008). OnBS is 
measured as the book value of securitized financial assets at the fiscal 
quarter end accounted for as secured borrowings. Since OnBS is accounted 
for as borrowings, the addition of OnBS needs to separate total liabilities 
into OnBS leverage and other leverage. OffBS is measured as the book 
value of securitized financial assets accounted for as a sale less the retained 
interest and servicing rights at the fiscal quarter end. The variables are 
scaled by the value of total assets (market value of equity plus book value 
of total liabilities).
10
 The inclusion of OffBS leverage also requires the net 
income to be adjusted to exclude securitization gains to restate the sale 
accounting of securitizations back to the secured-borrowing accounting. 
For H2, the prediction is 3 > 0. For H3a, the prediction is 2 < 4 . 
For H3b, the prediction is 5 < 3 . Equation (1) is also extended to a more 
complex version of interacting R with all the independent variables since 
Table 2.4 shows that all the control variables are significantly different 
before and after 2007. 
The other variables follow the ‘structural variables’ that have been 
modelled and empirically tested to be the main drivers of CDS pricing 
(Callen et al. 2009; Das et al. 2009; Ericsson et al. 2009). They include 
leverage of the firm other than securitizations (OLEV), profitability of the 
firm (AROA), and volatility of the firm’s assets (SDRT), risk-free interest 
                                                 
10
 The variables are also deflated using total assets; results are not sensitive to these changes. 
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rate (SPOT), size of the firm (SIZE), credit ratings of the firm (CRT) and an 
indicator for the restructuring clause in the CDS contract (DOC). More 
specifically, total liabilities scaled by the value of total assets are adopted as 
a proxy of total leverage (LEV). OLEV is estimated as LEV minus on-
balance sheet securitization at fiscal quarter end scaled by the value of total 
assets (market value of equity plus book value of total liabilities). ROA is 
measured as income before extraordinary items and discontinued 
operations scaled by total assets at the end of the quarter. The adjusted ROA 
(AROA) is ROA minus the securitization gains. SDRT is measured by the 
standard deviation of daily returns during the firm’s fiscal quarter. SPOT is 
the risk-free rate of interest (one-year US T-bill rate) at the SEC filing date. 
SIZE is the natural log of the market value of the firm’s equity at the end of 
fiscal quarter. CRT is the firm’s S&P 500 long-term credit rating at fiscal 
quarter end, which is sourced from the Compustat database and has been 
converted to a numerical scale. It shows a minimum of 2 (AAA) and 
maximum of 23 (C) with a median of 11 (BBB). DOC is an indicator 
variable with 1 if the CDS contract has ‘exclude restructuring’ clause and 0 
otherwise. 
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5 Sample 
Sample Selection 
Securitization data, including the outstanding balance of financial 
assets securitized, retained interests, servicing rights and securitization 
gains, was gathered from firms’ 10-Q and 10-K filings for the period from 
the first quarter of 2002 to the third quarter of 2009 (inclusive).
11
 Firms 
with securitization disclosures are initially identified through a key-word 
search using Direct-Edgar. When a firm did not disclose retained interests, 
servicing rights or securitization gains, it is assumed these values are 
immaterial and set to zero. 
CDS data was purchased from Markit.
12
 Markit provides a 
composite at-market CDS premium for a certain maturity of a CDS 
contract. This composite is derived from the average CDS premium 
contributed by a group of investment banks and brokers. The Markit CDS 
data includes relevant information on the maturity, seniority, date, 
restructuring clauses and reference entity of the CDS contract. All the CDS 
contracts are daily. To enhance the homogeneity of the sample, this study 
only includes CDS contracts on the firm’s senior debt. 
Other financial statement data and share price data were gathered 
from the Compustat and Centre for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) 
                                                 
11
 SFAS 140 (FASB 2000) became effective beginning 2001 and governed the securitization 
disclosures during this period. During this period, FIN46R (FASB 2003) was adopted after 
December 2003 to strengthen rules on consolidations. Prior research shows that firms entered 
into restructuring arrangements to avoid consolidating off-balance sheet securitization 
vehicles (Bens and Monahan 2008). 
12
 According to the Wall Street Journal, Markit Group Limited was founded in 2001 to 
provide credit risk pricing, especially the daily CDS pricing. Markit is owned by JP Morgan 
Chase & Co., Goldman Sachs Group Inc. and Credit Suisse Group. Markit shareholders also 
include Citigroup Inc., Deutsche Bank AG, Bank of America Corp., Barclays PLC, UBS AG, 
Morgan Stanley, HSBC Holdings PLC and asset managers. Markit is considered the dominant 
provider of credit market pricing and information (‘US Tightens Its Derivatives Vise’, 
WSJ.com, July 2009). 
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databases. Interest rate data was gathered from the Federal Reserve Bank’s 
interest rate publications. 
The sample selection process is summarized in Table 1. Initial CDS 
data includes 985,390 CDS contracts for 133 securitizing firms. Among the 
133 firms, 121 firms have enough information on securitization disclosed 
in 10K and 10Q filings. This securitization dataset has 2,527 firm-quarter 
observations from 121 securitizing firms after merging with Compustat and 
CRSP. In this process, 74 firm-quarter observations were lost due to 
missing values. This dataset was then merged with Markit’s CDS dataset 
using Markit Ticker symbols. Merging with the CDS dataset requires that 
each observation has at least a five-year CDS premium one day after the 
SEC filing date. If the CDS premium was missing on that date, the next 
first available CDS premium was then chosen.
13
 This lag was cut off at the 
30th day after the SEC filing date. This process yields a sample of 9,125 
CDS contracts based on five-year CDS contracts for 114 firms (1,837 firm-
quarters). After further excluding observations with missing CDS premium, 
the final sample has 8,470 CDS contracts (1,825 firm-quarters of 113 
firms) for the test of securitization’s associations with the CDS premium. 
Table 2 shows the distribution of observations by four-digit SIC 
codes. The final sample includes 113 firms, covering 71 SIC industries. As 
would be expected, commercial banks are the largest sector covering 13.48 
per cent of the total sample observations (including 16 commercial banks). 
The remainder of the sample firms are diversified across a wide range of 
industries. Compared with prior literature (Niu and Richardson 2006; 
                                                 
13
 Most of the observations have the CDS premium within a week after the SEC filing date. 
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Landsman et al. 2008; Dechow et al. 2010), this study has a larger and 
more diversified sample.
14
 
 
Sample Characteristics 
Table 3 provides descriptive statistics for the sample observations. 
The maximum value of off-balance sheet securitization is more than double 
that of on-balance sheet securitization (1.651 compared to 0.757), reflecting 
the more pervasive use of off-balance sheet securitization.
15
 The CDS 
premium has a mean (median) value of 4.46 (4.43), which is consistent 
with Callen et al. (2009). 
Firms engaging in securitizations typically have good credit ratings 
and are highly leveraged. The average of the firms’ credit rating is above 
the investment grade. The average leverage of the sample firms is high at 
approximately 65 per cent of the sum of their market value of equity and 
total liabilities. The maximum values of LEV and OLEV are given by a low 
market value of equity and a large value of total liability.
16
 
Table 4 compares the differences of means and medians of the main 
variables used in the credit risk tests before and after 2007. Allen and Bali’s 
(2007) model shows that it is crucial to consider cyclicality in the 
measurement of business and credit risks. Consistent with their 
propositions, Table 4 shows that the mean and median values of all the 
                                                 
14
 By comparison, the sample of Niu and Richardson (2006) has 535 firm-year observations 
from 1997 to 2003. In their sample, approximately 22 per cent of the observations are from 
commercial banks. Their sample also includes 15.3 per cent of mortgage bankers, which are 
not part of the current sample due to the lack of the CDS premium data. Therefore, banks 
account for more than 37 per cent of observations in the prior study’s sample. 
15
 When observations of off-balance sheet securitization are available but those of on-balance 
sheet securitization are missing, on-balance sheet securitization is set to be zero and vice versa 
to maximize the total number of observations. The results are similar keeping only non-zero 
observations of either off-balance sheet or on-balance sheet securitization. 
16
 This observation occurs in 2007 Q1 for Aramark Corp. 
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variables except leverage (OLEV) are significantly different before and 
after 2007. OLEV is not significantly different before and after 2007 
because they are scaled by the sum of total liability and the market value of 
equity, in which the market value of equity significantly drops after 2007. 
In general, Table 4 shows that values of variables affecting firms’ credit 
risk are significantly different before 2007 and after 2007, which 
strengthens the case for measuring credit risk through the business cycle. 
Table 5 reports Pearson (Spearman) correlations above (below) the 
diagonal. Only the Pearson correlations are discussed. As expected, OffBS 
are positively correlated with leverage (LEV). OnBS are negatively 
correlated with other borrowings (OLEV). The CDS premium is positively 
correlated with leverage (LEV and OLEV). This is consistent with the 
theory that borrowings increase the firm’s credit risk. The CDS premium is 
also positively correlated with standard deviation of the firm’s daily stock 
returns (SDRT). This is consistent with the theory that the increase in the 
volatility of asset values increases default risk. The CDS premium is 
positively correlated with the firm’s coded credit ratings (CRT). The CDS 
premium is negatively correlated with firm size (SIZE) and interest rate 
(SPOT). Intuitively larger size and higher interest rate lead to more wealth 
in the firm and lower credit risk. Profitability after adjusting for 
securitization gains (AROA) is negatively correlated with the CDS 
premium. This is consistent with prior research showing that higher 
earnings are negatively associated with the firm’s credit risk. 
Figure 1 shows that the CDS premium decreased from late 2002 
until the end of 2006 to the lowest level. In 2007, the CDS premium started 
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to rise significantly and peaked at mid-2009. Throughout 2009, the CDS 
premium remained relatively high. Consistent with the theoretical 
propositions in H2, Figure 1 shows a significant increase in the CDS 
premium after 2007. 
Figure 2 shows the trend of the ‘margin of security’ in asset 
securitizations, indicated by the movements in retained interests as 
percentages of securitized assets.
17
 Retained interests serve as first loss 
when assets underlying securitizations default. The larger the stake retained 
by the originator, the safer the securitized assets will be. As show in Figure 
2, retained interests decreased from 2003 onwards until to the lowest level 
in 2007. The amount of interests retained in securitizations significantly 
increased after 2007. The trend suggests that the ‘margin of security’ of 
asset securitizations decreases during economic growth and rises when the 
economy declines in the latest business cycle, which is consistent with the 
theoretical propositions in H3. 
 
  
                                                 
17
 As the information about the retained interests of on-balance sheet securitization is not 
disclosed by firms, the retained interests in Figure 2 belong to newly securitized assets of off-
balance sheet securitization. 
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6 Primary Regression Analyses 
Panel A of Table 6 reports the results of OLS estimations of three 
versions of Equation (1), including the basic version, which does not have 
the recession interaction term of R, and the extended version of interacting 
R with all of the variables.
18
 As the cross-sectional data include multiple 
observations from the same firm, the t-statistics for the coefficients are 
calculated using robust standard errors clustered at firm level (Petersen 
2009).
19
 The tests also directly control for industry with industry-fixed 
effects (suppressed) based on the 1-digit SIC codes to have sufficient 
number of firms within each industry. 
Column (1) of Panel A reports the regression results without 
interacting with the indicator variable of R. The total explanatory power of 
the model is high, with adjusted R
2
 at 78 per cent.
20
 H1 predicts that 
securitization (both on and off-balance sheet securitizations) is positively 
associated with default risk. Consistent with the prediction from H1, the 
coefficients on OffBS and OnBS are both positive and significant. The 
results indicate that securitization is on average positively associated with 
the originator’s credit risk. 
The coefficients on the control variables are also consistent with 
theory and prior research. The standard deviation of returns (SDRT) and 
leverage (OLEV) are positively correlated with the CDS premium. The risk-
                                                 
18
 Although no significant multicollinearity was detected by variance inflation factor, the 
regressions have also been run after demeaning all continuous independent variables. The 
results remain similar. 
19
 The t-statistics are also calculated using standard errors clustered by year and firm-year (two 
dimensions). The results remain similar. 
20
 The high R2 is in line with prior research on pricing of CDS (Benkert 2004; Callen et al. 
2009; Das et al. 2009; Bongaerts et al. 2011). Different from share price, the CDS pricing is 
pervasively based on the structural and reduced structural models. If the main structural 
variables used in these pricing models are controlled, the R2 is expected to be high. 
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free interest rate (SPOT) and SIZE are negatively correlated with the CDS 
premium. Higher credit rating is also associated with a lower CDS 
premium. Earnings adjusted for securitization gains (AROA) are negatively 
correlated with the CDS premium. As securitization gains often constitute a 
substantial part of the originator’s earnings and are priced as value relevant 
by the market (Niu and Richardson 2006), the coefficient of AROA 
becomes insignificant after excluding such gains from accounting earnings. 
H2 and H3 are jointly tested and reported in columns (2) and (3) of 
Panel A. Column (2) of Panel A reports the model in Equation (2), which 
includes an indicator variable R to account for a higher CDS premium 
during the recession period. In this model, R is interacted only with OffBS 
and OnBS. H2 predicts OffBS is more strongly correlated with the CDS 
premium after 2007 than before 2007. Consistent with this prediction, the 
coefficient on OffBS*R is positive and significant. The coefficient on OffBS 
without the interaction term is insignificant. These results indicate that off-
balance sheet securitization’s association with the CDS premium 
significantly rises after 2007. 
H3a predicts that on-balance sheet securitization is more positively 
associated with the CDS premium than off-balance sheet securitization. 
The coefficient on OnBS is significantly greater than the coefficient of 
OffBS (t=2.59), suggesting on-balance sheet securitization is more highly 
associated with the CDS premium before 2007. The coefficient on OnBS*R 
is negative but insignificant, which indicates that on-balance sheet 
securitization does not experience significant change in credit risk after 
2007. The difference between the coefficient on OnBS*R and the 
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coefficient on OffBS*R is insignificant (t=1.23), which is inconsistent with 
H3b. The sum of the coefficients on OnBS and OnBS*R is significantly 
greater than the sum of the coefficients on OffBS and OffBS*R (t=2.32), 
which indicates overall on-balance sheet securitization transfers less credit 
risk after 2007. Taken as a whole, on-balance sheet securitization has 
significantly stronger effects on the originator’s CDS premium than off-
balance sheet securitization, which is consistent with H3a. Moreover, on-
balance sheet and off-balance sheet securitizations demonstrate 
significantly different risk properties in the CDS market through the latest 
business cycle (2002–2009).  
Since many firm and market characteristics changed and the risks in 
the firms’ assets increased after 2007, the model in Column (3) of Panel A 
allows R to interact with all the independent variables. The coefficient on 
OffBS*R remains significantly positive and the coefficient on OffBS 
remains insignificantly different from zero. This is consistent with the 
prediction in H2. The results for H2 persist after imposing a stricter 
specification. The coefficients and significance levels of OnBS*R and 
OnBS are similar with those in Column (2) of Panel A. The coefficient on 
OLEV*R remains significantly positive. It suggests the credit risk in other 
liabilities, in contrast to on-balance sheet securitizations, generally 
increased after 2007. 
Asset securitizations’ effects on the originator’s CDS premium are 
likely to vary with the (initial) maturity of the CDS contract. Panel B of 
Table 6 presents the regression results after interacting maturity indicators 
with off-balance sheet and on-balance sheet securitizations. OffBS_m and 
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OnBS_m represent the incremental effects of securitizations on the CDS 
premium with contract maturity m (m=3, 5, 7, 10), relative to one-year 
maturity contract. Column (1) of Panel B shows that higher levels of 
securitizations significantly increase the premium of one-year CDS 
contract. The marginal incremental effects for maturity interactions are 
negative but insignificant except for OffBS_3, which indicates that on 
average securitizations’ associations with the CDS premium are not 
significantly different across maturities. Column (2) of Panel B shows the 
regression results of further interacting R with maturities. The coefficients 
on OffBS*R decrease with longer maturities (except for OffBS_5*R), 
indicating a weaker association between off-balance sheet securitizations 
and the CDS premium as the maturity increases during the recession. The 
coefficients on OnBS*R are also negative across maturities, but only the 
coefficients on OnBS_3*R and OnBS_5*R are marginally significant. 
Panel C of Table 6 reports the total maturity effects, computed as 
adding the marginal effects shown in Panel B. As expected, coefficients on 
OffBS*R and OnBS are significant. The coefficients on OnBS become 
larger as the maturity increases, indicating stronger associations between 
on-balance sheet securitizations and the CDS premium as the contract 
maturity increases. By contrast, the coefficients on OffBS*R demonstrate an 
overall decreasing trend with increasing maturities, which is 
counterintuitive because the CDS premium is normally more expensive for 
longer maturities. A possible explanation is that the demand of CDS 
contracts with shorter maturities was much greater than those with longer 
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maturities during the recession, reflecting a potential liquidity preference of 
shorter maturities over longer maturities.  
In summary, the results are consistent with H2 and H3a. Both off-
balance sheet and on-balance sheet securitizations are positively associated 
with the originator’s CDS premium before controlling for the recession. 
Strong results are found that off-balance sheet securitization’s association 
with the CDS premium significantly increases after 2007 when the 
economy declines. After 2007, on-balance sheet securitization does not 
experience a significant increase in the association with the CDS premium. 
In general, on-balance sheet securitization is more highly associated with 
the CDS premium than off-balance sheet securitization. These results 
indicate that the CDS market becomes doubtful about whether the 
originator could fully honour its implicit guarantees for off-balance sheet 
securitizations. The evidence also points that off-balance sheet and on-
balance sheet securitizations have different credit risk properties. 
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7 Sensitivity Analyses 
As shown in the descriptive statistics, there are large values in the 
observations of the CDS premium and leverage. Therefore, the CDS 
premium and leverage are separately winsorized at the upper tails to 
mitigate the potential influences. The previously discussed results of the 
regression analyses persist after winsorizing these extreme observations at 
either the one per cent or five per cent level.
21
 
Potential omitted variables that may explain changes in the CDS 
premium have been considered. Cumulative stock returns, the market-to-
book ratio, the yield curve and the liquidity curve are included in the 
regressions to test the robustness of the results. Stock returns are proxies 
for the changes of the economic condition of the firm. The slope of the 
yield curve (the difference between one year and 10 year t-bill rates) is a 
proxy for expectations of future interest rate changes. The slope of the 
liquidity curve (the difference between the one-year interest rate swap rate 
and one-year t-bill rate) is a proxy for the changes of liquidity conditions in 
the market. The results are not sensitive to the inclusion of these variables. 
To address the concerns about whether the results are driven by the 
possible market-wide panic during the financial crisis, Equation (1) is 
estimated after omitting the observations in 2008. Year 2008 is the period 
when the market received consecutive major shocks. These major events 
include the seizure of Northern Rock by British Treasury (February), the 
sale of Bear Sterns to JPMorgan Chase (March), the near collapse of 
American International Group (September) and the demise of Lehman 
                                                 
21
 Deleting potentially influential observations (with absolute values of Student residuals 
greater than 2) yields similar results, except that on-balance sheet securitization becomes 
significantly negative when interacting with R (OnBS*R). 
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Brothers (September). The results persist after deleing the observations in 
2008. 
Instead of level analysis, the change of CDS premium is regressed 
on the change of securitizations. The coefficients on the change variables 
are significant only for half-yearly results. As suggested by Barth et al. 
(2001), significant levels results suggest that securitizations are relevant in 
assessing credit risk in the CDS market. The less significant changes results 
suggest the securitization disclosures contained in the notes of financial 
statements are not timely. 
 
Propensity-Score Matching 
Although robust standard errors clustered by firm have considered 
firm characteristics, there might still be some endogeneity concerns in the 
research design. Such concerns originate from a firm’s endogenous choice 
of on-balance sheet versus off-balance sheet securitization, which can be 
correlated with credit risk. To address such concerns, I adopt the 
propensity-score matching process, which is a preferred approach to 
address the issue (Lawrence et al. 2011). 
Following prior research (Armstrong et al. 2010; Lawrence et al. 
2011), I match a range of firm characteristics, which are considered related 
to the choice of on-balance sheet or off-balance sheet securitization. The 
attribute-based matching naturally phases out the effects of the differences 
in on-balance sheet or off-balance sheet securitization firms’ characteristics 
on the CDS premium. I use a logit model to estimate the probability of 
choosing off-balance sheet versus on-balance sheet securitization, and save 
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the estimated probability (the propensity-score). I then match, without 
replacement, a firm with on-balance sheet securitization with a firm with 
off-balance sheet securitization that has the closest predicted value from the 
logit model within a maximum distance of three per cent. The logit model 
is specified as follows: 
0 1 2 3 4
5 6 7 8 (1 )
it it it it it
it it it it it
SECTN LEV NSI RENG OPTN
GROW FUND SDRT SIZE a
    
    
    
    
 
Where: 
SECTN  = 1 if the firm chooses off-balance sheet securitization, and 0 
if the firm chooses on-balance sheet securitization;  
LEV  = total liabilities deflated by the sum of market value of 
equity and total liabilities of the firm; 
NSI = net issue of stock, measured as the difference between 
common and preferred stock sale and purchase divided by 
average total assets; 
RENG = renegotiation costs, measured as long-term debt due within 
one year, that is, debt in current liabilities divided by 
average total assets; 
OPTN = CEO equity incentive, measured as the fair value of CEO 
option awards divided by CEO total compensation, 
winsorized at 99
th
 percentile; 
GROW = proprietary costs, measured as the growth rate of revenue 
from quarter t to quarter t+4 adjusted for the corresponding 
growth rate of total assets; revenues of banks are measured 
as interest income plus non-interest income; 
FUND = availability of internal funds, measured as the sum of cash 
flow from operating and cash flow from investing divided 
by average total assets; 
SDRT  = standard deviation of daily returns during the current fiscal 
quarter ; 
SIZE  = natural log of the market value of equity at the end of fiscal 
quarter; 
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i  = firm subscript; 
t  = time subscript for quarter t. 
   
   
One of the benefits of off-balance sheet securitizations is to reduce 
book leverage while increasing actual leverage (Dechow and Shakespeare 
2009). In contrast, firms using on-balance sheet securitizations may need to 
rely more on external equity financing than firms using off-balance sheet 
securitizations. Therefore, I include financial leverage (LEV) and net share 
issue (NSI) in Equation (1a). Moreover, when lenders do not have enough 
knowledge of borrowing firms’ off-balance sheet leverage, off-balance 
sheet securitizations will not increase renegotiation costs (RENG). Higher 
leverage is associated with greater volatility of share price. Greater 
volatility of share price increases the value of CEO’s option awards 
(OPTN) (Guay 1999; Coles et al. 2006). Another benefit of asset 
securitizations is to improve the firm’s cash flows (FUND).22 Therefore, I 
also add FUND in Equation (1a). Off-balance sheet securitization increases 
information uncertainty about the firm (Cheng et al. 2011), while on-
balance sheet securitization stays as the originator’s borrowings and 
generates little uncertainty about the risk transfer. Therefore, it is possible 
that firms having higher future growth opportunities and more uncertain 
future prospects will tend to use less of off-balance sheet securitization and 
more of on-balance sheet securitization. Therefore, I include future growth 
                                                 
22
 It has to be acknowledged that quarterly cash flows (FUND) may not be the ideal proxy of 
cash flows associated with asset securitizations, because firms often manage the timing of 
asset securitizations to window dress balance sheet at the end of the year (Dechow and 
Shakespeare 2009). FUND is, however, the proxy currently available in prior research. 
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of the firm (GROW), measured as the revenue growth for one year 
forward.
23
 
Using Equation (1a) to calculate propensity scores and imposing a 
calliper distance of three per cent, I obtain a propensity-score matched 
sample of 3,378 firm-quarter observations, of which 1,689 belongs to firms 
with off-balance sheet securitization and 1,689 belongs to firms with on-
balance sheet securitization. 
Table 7 presents the means and standard deviations of the main 
characteristics of the matched firms. The propensity-score model appears to 
be effective in forming a balanced sample of firms with off-balance sheet 
securitization and on-balance sheet securitization, as the main variables 
related to securitization appear to be insignificantly different. The 
difference in CRT is not surprising, because it merely reflects the fact that 
credit rating agencies include off-balance sheet securitization in the 
calculation of a firm’s leverage. 
Table 8 presents the regression results of estimating Equation (1) 
using the propensity-score matched sample. In Column (1) of Table 8, the 
coefficient on OnBS remains significantly positive, but the coefficient on 
OffBS becomes insignificant. In Column (2) of Table 8, the coefficient on 
OffBS becomes significantly negative and the coefficient on OffBS*R 
remains significantly positive, indicating significant increase in credit risk 
of off-balance sheet securitization only after 2007. The coefficient on 
OnBS*R is insignificant, which indicates the credit risk of on-balance sheet 
                                                 
23
 As the sample includes commercial banks, the revenue of a bank is measured as interest 
income plus non-interest income. 
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securitization does not experience significant change after 2007. The results 
are generally consistent with the main predictions. 
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8 Conclusion 
This paper investigates the effects of off-balance sheet and on-
balance sheet securitizations on the originator’s CDS premium. To the best 
of my knowledge, this is the first empirical evidence on the effects of asset 
securitizations with different structures. Using a more direct measure of 
credit risk than stock returns, bond yields and credit ratings, I find that the 
off-balance sheet securitizations’ effects on the originator’s CDS premium 
significantly rise after 2007. On-balance sheet securitization’s effects on 
the originator’s CDS premium are generally stronger than off-balance sheet 
securitizations across the business cycle, but on-balance sheet 
securitization’s effects on the originator’s CDS premium do not 
significantly change after 2007. 
These results have implications for regulators. They suggest that the 
CDS market reassesses the risk associated with off-balance sheet 
securitizations with the view that the originator might not fully honour its 
implicit guarantees for off-balance sheet securitizations after the crisis. It 
would be beneficial to investors if regulations could take into 
considerations the changing credit risks in off-balance sheet securitizations. 
Moreover, the evidence also indicates that on-balance sheet and off-balance 
sheet securitizations contain different risk properties. It may be necessary to 
differentiate regulatory requirements, such as capital requirements, for 
these two types of asset securitizations. Additionally, by documenting the 
effects of asset securitizations with different structures on the originator’s 
CDS premium before and after the recent financial crisis, I contribute to the 
literature on the effects of information uncertainty on asset prices. 
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With the expectations that there will be more on-balance sheet 
securitization, future research can further investigate whether the secured-
borrowing treatment overstates the leverage and the risk of the originator. 
Due to the constraints of data availability, this study could not carry out 
further analyses on the impact of different types of securitized assets on 
credit risk. Such information is not disclosed in firms’ 10K or 10Q filings. 
This study acknowledges such a major limitation in the study. With more 
detailed disclosures becoming available in the future, future research can 
examine how the types of underlying assets will impact the risk of a 
securitizing firm. 
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Figure 1 
Trend of Monthly Means of Sample CDS Premia 
          
 
 
        
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
           
        
Figure 2.1 represents the monthly mean values of the sample CDS premia from January 2002 to 
December 2009. The mean values are calculated from natural logs of 211,611 daily observations of 
the premium (in basis point) of the CDS contract with five-year maturity provided by Markit. 
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Figure 2 
Trend of the ‘Margin of Security’ Indicated by Retained Interests as Percentages of 
Securitized Assets 
 
 
 
        
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
         
          
        
Figure 2.2 represents the quarterly median values of retained interests as percentages of securitized 
assets of the sample firms from 2002 Q1 to 2009 Q3. The median values are calculated from the 
amount of interests retained in securitized assets divided by the amount of securitized assets. The 
values of retained interests and securitized assets are hand collected from the sample firms’ 10-Q and 
10-K filings. 
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Table 1 
Sample Selection 
Sample Structure 
 
Observations 
Number of observations in CDS daily dataset  985,390 daily observations of 133 
firms 
    
 Number of observations in the securitization dataset 
with firms initially identified through Direct-Edgar 
and securitization observations collected from 10-k 
and 10-Q filings (2002–2009) 
 2,527 firm-quarter observations of 121 
firms 
    
 Merging the securitization dataset with the 
Compustat/CRSP database for 2002–2009 
 2,453 firm-quarter observations of 121 
firms 
    
Merging CDS dataset with the merged securitization 
dataset, requiring that each observation has at least a 
five-year CDS premium within 30 days after the SEC 
filing date  
 9,125 contracts based on five-year 
CDS, 1,837 firm-quarters of 114 
firms 
           
Excluding observations with missing CDS premium in 
other than five-year CDS contracts 
 8,470 CDS contracts, 1,825 firm-
quarters of 113 firms 
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Table 2 
Sample Distribution by Industry 
SIC 
Code SIC Name 
N 
(Obs.) 
N 
(Firm) 
Frequency 
(%) 
6020 Commercial Banks 1142 16 13.483 
3711 Motor Vehicles & Passenger Car Bodies 402 3 4.746 
6211 Security Brokers, Dealers & Flotation Companies 375 3 4.427 
4931 Electric & Other Services Combined 360 5 4.250 
3672 Printed Circuit Boards 287 3 3.388 
6111 Federal & Federally-Sponsored Credit Agencies 246 3 2.904 
3714 Motor Vehicle Parts & Accessories 244 3 2.881 
2631 Paperboard Mills 234 2 2.763 
6199 Finance Services 225 2 2.656 
3523 Farm Machinery & Equipment 218 2 2.574 
7011 Hotels & Motels 205 2 2.420 
6141 Personal Credit Institutions 198 3 2.338 
2860 Industrial Organic Chemicals 180 2 2.125 
3531 Construction Machinery & Equip 155 1 1.830 
2836 Biological Products, (No Disgnostic Substances) 150 1 1.771 
3942 Dolls & Stuffed Toys 150 1 1.771 
4911 Electric Services 141 2 1.665 
5531 Retail-Auto & Home Supply Stores 140 1 1.653 
6172 Finance Lessors 140 1 1.653 
6282 Investment Advice 132 1 1.558 
3312 Steel Works, Blast Furnaces & Rolling Mills (Coke Ovens) 130 1 1.535 
2821 Plastic Materials, Synth Resins & Nonvulcan Elastomers 128 1 1.511 
3411 Metal Cans 128 1 1.511 
4011 Railroads, Line-Haul Operating 125 1 1.476 
3944 Games, Toys & Children's Vehicles (No Dolls & Bicycles) 115 1 1.358 
2650 Paperboard Containers & Boxes 111 2 1.311 
3221 Glass Containers 110 1 1.299 
3510 Engines And Turbines 110 1 1.299 
3826 Laboratory Analytical Instruments 109 1 1.287 
1221 Bituminous Coal & Lignite Surface Mining 106 1 1.251 
5912 Retail-Drug Stores And Proprietary Stores 105 1 1.240 
7373 Services-Computer Integrated Systems Design 97 1 1.145 
2011 Meat Packing Plants 91 1 1.074 
2911 Petroleum Refining 90 1 1.063 
6411 Insurance Agents, Brokers & Service 90 1 1.063 
3721 Aircraft 85 2 1.004 
Other* 
 
1416 38 16.718 
Total 
 
8470 113 100% 
    
   This table reports the sample distribution by industry. N (Obs.) is the number of observations of a 
particular 4-digit SIC industry in the sample. N (Firm) is the number of firms of a particular 4-digit SIC 
industry in the sample. Frequency is a 4-digit SIC industry's percentage proportion in the sample.  
The final sample consists of 8,470 observations between 2002 and 2009.  
Other*: All the industries with less than 1 percent of the sample observations. The total number of 4-
digit SIC industries represented in the sample is 71. 
 
  
46 
 
 
Table 3 
Descriptive Statistics 
         Variable N Mean Min. Q1 Median Q3 Max. SD. 
OffBS 8470 0.084 0.000 0.006 0.021 0.067 1.651 0.167 
OnBS 8470 0.021 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.757 0.080 
LEV 8470 0.648 0.068 0.467 0.679 0.850 0.999 0.229 
OLEV 8470 0.626 0.068 0.447 0.645 0.829 0.999 0.227 
SDRT 8470 0.012 0.005 0.007 0.008 0.013 0.044 0.009 
SIZE 8470 8.982 –3.388 7.983 8.951 10.000 12.944 1.537 
CDS 8470 4.462 0.344 3.430 4.425 5.485 10.304 1.421 
AROA 8470 0.003 –0.472 0.001 0.004 0.011 0.199 0.034 
CRT 8470 10.823 2.000 8.000 11.000 13.000 29.000 3.597 
SPOT 8470 0.028 0.003 0.013 0.023 0.047 0.053 0.017 
DOC 8470 0.920 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.271 
R 8470 0.503 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 0.500 
            
   This table reports the descriptive statistics of the variables used in Equation (1).  
Variable Definitions: 
OffBS outstanding dollar amount of securitized financial assets accounted for as a sale minus 
the retained interests and servicing rights as of the fiscal quarter end scaled by the sum 
of market value of equity and total liabilities; 
OnBS outstanding dollar amount of securitized financial assets accounted for as secured 
borrowings as of the fiscal quarter end scaled by the sum of market value of equity and 
total liabilities; 
LEV total liabilities scaled by the sum of market value of equity and total liabilities; 
OLEV total liabilities less the amount of on-balance sheet securitization scaled by the sum of 
market value of equity and total liabilities; 
SDRT standard deviation of daily stock returns for the current fiscal quarter; 
SIZE natural log of the market value of equity ($ millions); 
CDS natural log of CDS premium (in basis point) for CDS contract first observed within 30 
days after the SEC filing date;  
AROA net income before extraordinary items minus the securitization gains scaled by total 
assets; 
CRT S&P long-term credit rating; 
SPOT US one-year t-bill rate;  
DOC indicator variable with 1 if the CDS contract has ‘exclude restructuring’ clause and 0 
otherwise; 
R indicator variable for the recession period with 1 if an observation of CDS premium is 
after 1 January 2007 and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 4 
Differences in Variables Before 2007 and After 2007 
             
  
Before 2007
 
After 2007 
 
t-test 
 
Wilcoxon 
Variable 
 
Mean 
 
 
Median  
 
Mean 
 
 
Median  
 
 p-
value*  
 
 p-value * 
CDS 
 
4.0322 
 
3.8782 
 
4.8877 
 
4.9057 
 
<.0001 
 
<.0001 
SIZE 
 
9.2016 
 
9.2094 
 
8.8473 
 
8.7793 
 
<.0001 
 
<.0001 
OLEV 
 
0.6307 
 
0.6734 
 
0.6250 
 
0.6233 
 
0.2493 
 
0.4138 
AROA 
 
0.0058 
 
0.0042 
 
0.0011 
 
0.0045 
 
<.0001 
 
0.0009 
SDRT 
 
0.0081 
 
0.0070 
 
0.0157 
 
0.0123 
 
<.0001 
 
<.0001 
CRT 
 
10.4402 
 
11.0000 
 
11.2027 
 
11.0000 
 
<.0001 
 
<.0001** 
SPOT 
 
0.0321 
 
0.0330 
 
0.0240 
 
0.0197 
 
<.0001 
 
<.0001 
OffBS 
 
0.0967 
 
0.0266 
 
0.0750 
 
0.0169 
 
<.0001 
 
<.0001 
OnBS   0.0150 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0269 
 
0.0000 
 
<.0001 
 
<.0001** 
This table reports differences in means and medians of the main variables used in Equation 
(1) for before 2007 and after 2007. The sample consists of 8,470 observations between 2002 
and 2009. T-test (Wilcoxon) p-values test for differences in means (medians) for before 2007 
and after 2007.  
*: P-value is probability > |t| for differences of means and probability > |Z| for differences of 
Wilcoxon median scores (rank sums). 
**: The Wilcoxon p-value can still be significant even when the medians are equal, because 
Wilcoxon tests are rank sum tests and the values other than those at the median from two 
groups can have different ranks even if the medians are equal. 
The variables are defined in Table 3. 
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Table 5 
Correlations 
            N OffBS OnBS LEV OLEV SDRT SIZE CDS AROA CRT SPOT 
OffBS 8470 1 0.260 0.259 0.170 –0.036 0.122 –0.047 –0.085 –0.248 0.027 
OnBS 8470 –0.341 1 0.208 –0.145 0.053 –0.184 0.106 –0.030 –0.109 –0.024 
LEV 8470 0.353 0.114 1 0.938 0.139 0.022 0.239 –0.273 –0.085 –0.125 
OLEV 8470 0.321 –0.095 0.924 1 0.122 0.087 0.205 –0.265 –0.048 –0.118 
SDRT 8470 –0.054 0.125 0.137 –0.265 1 –0.180 0.423 –0.202 0.077 –0.626 
SIZE 8470 0.236 –0.201 0.079 0.129 –0.144 1 –0.560 0.153 –0.623 0.155 
CDS 8470 –0.068 0.143 0.210 0.171 0.421 –0.562 1 –0.251 0.670 –0.403 
AROA 8470 –0.268 –0.065 0.210 –0.617 –0.108 0.100 –0.304 1 –0.167 0.110 
CRT 8470 –0.268 0.035 –0.151 –0.129 0.052 –0.677 0.685 –0.094 1 –0.054 
SPOT 8470 0.035 –0.088 –0.132 –0.121 –0.712 0.139 –0.388 0.110 –0.047 1 
            
      Pearson (Spearman) correlations for the sample of Equation (1) are reported above (below) the diagonal. 
Correlations significant at the five per cent level in a two-tailed test are in boldface. 
This table reports the correlations of the main variables used in Equation (1). The variables are defined in Table 3. 
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Table 6 
OLS Regression Results for the Associations of Off-Balance Sheet and On-
Balance Sheet Treatments of Securitizations with the CDS Premium 
       
 
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8 9 10 11 12 13
* *
_ (1)
it it it it it it it
it it it it it j j it it
CDS R OffBS OffBS R OnBS OnBS R AROA OLEV
CRT SDRT SIZE SPOT DOC D m Ind
       
       
       
        
 
Panel A: Regressions of CDS Premium on Off-balance Sheet and On-balance Sheet 
Securitizations  
       
Variable 
(Predicted Sign) 
 
Without 
interaction with R 
 
Interacting R with 
OffBS and OnBS 
 
Interacting R with all 
the variables 
       Intercept 1.02***  0.91** 0.87 
  (2.65)  (2.44)  (0.95) 
R(+)    0.24***  –0.17 
    (4.19)  (–0.17) 
OffBS(+)  0.39**  –0.11  0.09 
  (2.04)  (–0.59)  (0.51) 
OffBS*R(+)    1.11***  0.58*** 
    (3.12)  (2.80) 
OnBS(+)  3.26***  3.95***  3.93** 
  (6.37)  (2.48)  (2.28) 
OnBS*R(–)    –1.34  –0.97 
    (–0.69)  (–0.50) 
AROA(–)  –0.33  –0.50  –1.76** 
  (–0.53)  (–0.80)  (–2.09) 
AROA*R(–)      1.30 
      (1.32) 
OLEV(+)  1.73***  1.74***  1.40*** 
  (6.99)  (6.81)  (4.68) 
OLEV*R(+)      0.69*** 
      (2.96) 
CRT(+)  0.21***  0.22***  0.27*** 
  (12.82)  (14.11)  (8.46) 
CRT*R(+)      –0.07** 
      (–2.06) 
SDRT(+)  32.40***  24.10***  63.88*** 
  (10.54)  (9.36)  (9.45) 
SDRT*R(+)      –46.47*** 
      (–6.54) 
SIZE(–)  –0.08***  –0.07**  –0.13* 
  (–2.52)  (–2.24)  (–1.87) 
SIZE*R(–)      0.13 
50 
 
      (1.61) 
SPOT(–)  –16.11***  –17.32***  –13.05*** 
  (–11.87)  (–12.97)  (–8.65) 
SPOT*R(–)      –8.99*** 
      (–3.99) 
DOC(+)  0.49***  0.49***  0.29*** 
  (5.88)  (6.12)  (3.01) 
DOC*R      0.31** 
      (2.22) 
D_3  0.49***  0.49***  0.49*** 
  (31.75)  (31.93)  (31.62) 
D_5  0.77***  0.78***  0.77*** 
  (29.49)  (29.89)  (29.43) 
D_7  0.89***  0.89***  0.89*** 
  (30.07)  (30.20)  (30.05) 
D_10  0.10***  0.99***  0.10*** 
  (28.09)  (28.26)  (28.15) 
       
Industry-fixed 
effects  
 Yes  Yes  Yes 
 Adj. R
2  0.777  0.791  0.813 
# Observations  8470  8470  8470 
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Panel B: Regressions with Maturity Interaction 
Variable 
(Predicted Sign) 
  
Without interaction 
with R 
  
Interacting R with 
OffBS and OnBS 
       Intercept 
  
0.99***   0.89** 
 
  
2.58   (2.37) 
R(+) 
  
   0.24*** 
 
  
   (4.18) 
OffBS(+) 
  
0.51**   –0.18 
 
  
(2.01)   (–0.61) 
OffBS_3 
  
–0.16**   –0.001 
 
  
(–2.12)   (–0.02) 
OffBS_5 
  
–0.10   0.03 
 
  
(–0.61)   (0.15) 
OffBS_7 
  
–0.18   0.08 
 
  
(–1.03)   (0.40) 
OffBS_10 
  
–0.15   0.21 
 
  
(–0.72)   (0.87) 
OffBS*R(+) 
  
   1.51*** 
 
  
   (3.17) 
OffBS_3*R 
  
   –0.35** 
 
  
   (–2.32) 
OffBS_5*R 
  
   –0.30 
 
  
   (–1.11) 
OffBS_7*R 
  
   –0.57** 
 
  
   (–2.19) 
OffBS_10*R 
  
   –0.79*** 
 
  
   (–2.51) 
OnBS(+) 
  
3.67***   3.34* 
 
  
(7.26)   (1.71) 
OnBS_3 
  
–0.13   0.61** 
 
  
(–0.50)   (2.41) 
OnBS_5 
  
–0.86   0.81 
 
  
(–1.11)   (1.60) 
OnBS_7 
  
–0.42   0.77 
 
  
(–0.87)   (1.41) 
OnBS_10 
  
–0.57   0.76 
 
  
(–1.05)   (1.18) 
OnBS*R(–) 
  
   0.14 
 
  
   (0.05) 
OnBS_3*R 
  
   –1.04* 
 
  
   (–1.75) 
OnBS_5*R 
  
   –2.40* 
 
  
   (–1.83) 
OnBS_7*R 
  
   –1.73 
52 
 
 
  
   (–1.44) 
OnBS_10*R 
  
   –1.92 
 
  
   (–1.40) 
AROA(–) 
  
–0.33   –0.50 
 
  
(–0.53)   (–0.79) 
OLEV(+) 
  
1.73***   1.74*** 
 
  
(6.99)   (6.81) 
CRT(+) 
  
0.21***   0.22*** 
 
  
(12.84)   (14.13) 
SDRT(+) 
  
32.40***   24.12*** 
 
  
(10.54)   (9.39) 
SIZE(–) 
  
–0.08***   –0.07** 
 
  
(–2.52)   (–2.23) 
SPOT(–) 
  
–16.11***   –17.31*** 
 
  
(–11.87)   (–12.93) 
DOC(+) 
  
0.49***   0.49*** 
 
  
(5.88)   (6.09) 
D_3 
  
0.50***   0.50*** 
 
  
(31.06)   (30.03) 
D_5 
  
0.80***   0.80*** 
 
  
(28.5)   (28.05) 
D_7 
  
0.92***   0.92*** 
 
  
(29.66)   (28.82) 
D_10 
  
1.02***   1.02*** 
   
(27.64)   (26.97) 
       Industry-fixed 
effects  
 Yes 
 
 Yes 
 Adj. R
2   0.777 
 
 0.792 
# Observations   8470 
 
 8470 
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Panel C: Tests for Off-balance Sheet and On-balance Sheet Securitizations across 
Maturities and Interactions with R 
         
  
OffBS 
 
OffBS*R 
 
OnBS  
 
OnBS*R 
1-Year CDS 
 
–0.18 
 
1.51*** 
 
3.34* 
 
0.14 
  
(–0.61) 
 
(3.17) 
 
(1.71) 
 
(0.05) 
3-Year CDS 
 
–0.18 
 
1.16*** 
 
3.95** 
 
–0.90 
  
(–0.76) 
 
(2.95) 
 
(2.30) 
 
(–0.42) 
5-Year CDS 
 
–0.15 
 
1.21*** 
 
4.15*** 
 
–2.26 
  
(–0.80) 
 
(3.16) 
 
(2.79) 
 
(–1.20) 
7-Year CDS 
 
–0.1 
 
0.94*** 
 
4.11*** 
 
–1.59 
  
(–0.56) 
 
(2.94) 
 
(2.80) 
 
(–0.99) 
10-Year CDS 
 
0.03 
 
0.72*** 
 
4.10*** 
 
–1.79 
  
(0.23) 
 
(2.55) 
 
(2.98) 
 
(–1.22) 
*,**,*** Indicates statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, under 
two-tailed tests. 
Reported are the coefficients from models using firm-clustered standard errors and industry-
fixed effects (suppressed); t-statistics are in parentheses. Industry-fixed effects are based on 
the 1-digit SIC code. 
Panel A (columns 1–3) reports OLS estimation of the basic version (without interaction with 
R) of Equation (1), Equation (1) and extended version (interacting R with all the independent 
variables) of Equation (1). Column (1) reports the result of the estimation of the base model 
without the indicator variable R. Column (2) reports the result of the estimation of Equation 
(1). Column (3) reports the result of the estimation of the extended model of interacting R 
with all the independent variables in Equation (1).  
Column (1) of Panel B extends the regression results in Panel A by interacting off-balance 
sheet and on-balance sheet securitizations with the maturity indicator variables. The OffBS 
and OnBS coefficients with suffix m (m=3,5,7,10) represent the interaction of OffBS and 
OnBS with D_m, an indicator variable equal to 1 if the CDS contract maturity is m years and 
0 otherwise (m=3,5,7,10). Thus, OffBS_m and OnBS_m represent the incremental effect of 
OffBS and OnBS on the premium of the CDS contract with maturity m over the impact of 
OffBS and OnBS on the premium of the CDS contract with one year to maturity. Column (2) 
of Panel B further interacts R with OffBS_m and OnBS_m to show the effect of economic 
declines on the relations of OffBS and OnBS to the premium of the CDS contract with 
maturity m. 
Panel C reports the overall coefficients for OffBS and OnBS for the different maturities; t-
statistics are in parentheses.  
D_mis 1 (0) if the CDS contract maturity is (is not) m years (m=3, 5, 7, 10). ∑jInd is 1 (0) if a 
firm is (is not) in industry j, based on 1-digit SIC codes. All other variables are defined in 
Table 3. 
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Table 7 
Differences in Means of the Main Variables: 
Propensity-Score Matched Sample 
         
  
Firms with OffBS 
 
Firms with OnBS 
 
t-test 
Variable 
 
Mean Std. Dev. 
 
Mean Std. Dev. 
 
 p-value*  
CDS 
 
4.7578 1.3464 
 
4.7869 1.4041 
 
0.5394 
SIZE 
 
8.8046 1.5623 
 
8.7182 1.3408 
 
0.0844 
LEV 
 
0.6642 0.2184 
 
0.6735 0.2045 
 
0.2026 
AROA 
 
–0.0003 0.0466 
 
0.0011 0.0303 
 
0.2992 
SDRT 
 
0.0139 0.0100 
 
0.0138 0.0100 
 
0.9098 
SPOT 
 
0.0258 0.0175 
 
0.0260 0.0176 
 
0.8672 
CRT   11.5222 3.7819 
 
11.2647 3.3020 
 
0.0351 
This table reports differences in means of the main variables of the propensity-score 
matched sample for firms with OffBS and firms with OnBS. The sample consists of 
3,378 observations between 2002 and 2009 with 1,689 observations for firms with 
OffBS and 1,689 for firms with OnBS.  
*: P-value is probability > |t| for differences of means. T-test (p-values) is for 
differences in means between firms with OffBS and firms with OnBS in the matched 
sample.  
The variables are defined in Table 3. 
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Table 8 
OLS Regression Results for the Associations of Off-Balance Sheet and On-
Balance Sheet Treatments of Securitizations with the CDS Premium: 
Propensity-Score Matched Sample 
        
 
 
        Variable
(Predicted Sign) 
  
Without interaction 
with R 
  
Interacting R with 
OffBS and OnBS 
Intercept 
 
 0.12  0.43 
 
 
 (0.26)   (1.01) 
R(+) 
 
    0.12 
 
 
    (1.41) 
OffBS(+) 
 
 − 0.40   − 1.57*** 
 
 
 (− 0.80)   (− 2.82) 
OffBS*R(+) 
 
    2.36*** 
 
 
    (4.09) 
OnBS(+) 
 
 2.33***   2.08** 
 
 
 (4.88)   (1.99) 
OnBS*R(–) 
 
    0.91 
 
 
    (0.78) 
AROA(–) 
 
 − 1.11*   − 1.47*** 
 
 
 (− 1.81)   (− 2.64) 
OLEV(+) 
 
 1.63***   1.73*** 
 
 
 (4.78)   (5.16) 
CRT(+) 
 
 0.24***   0.22*** 
 
 
 (10.63)   (11.16) 
SDRT(+) 
 
 28.64***   21.95*** 
 
 
 (6.36)   (5.43) 
SIZE(–) 
 
 0.03   − 0.01 
 
 
 (0.61)   (− 0.17) 
SPOT(–) 
 
 − 17.38***   − 16.97*** 
 
 
 (− 7.21)   (− 7.31) 
DOC(+) 
 
 0.29**   0.41*** 
 
 
 (2.07)   (3.40) 
D_3 
 
 0.45***   0.45*** 
 
 
 (18.42)   (18.34) 
D_5 
 
 0.69***   0.70*** 
 
 
 (17.36)   (17.52) 
D_7 
 
 0.80***   0.80*** 
 
 
 (17.17)   (17.20) 
D_10 
 
 0.87***   0.87*** 
  
 (15.97)   (16.05) 
       Industry-fixed 
effects  
 Yes   Yes 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8 9 10 11 12 13
* *
_ (1)
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        
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 Adj. R
2   0.766   0.788 
# Observations   3378   3378 
*,**,*** Indicates statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, 
under two-tailed tests. 
Reported are the coefficients from models using firm-clustered standard errors and 
industry-fixed effects (suppressed); t-statistics are in parentheses. Industry-fixed effects are 
based on the 1-digit SIC code. 
This table reports OLS estimation of the basic version (without interaction with R) of 
Equation (1) and Equation (1) for the propensity-score matched sample. Column (1) 
reports the result of the estimation of the base model without the indicator variable R. 
Column (2) reports the result of the estimation of Equation (1).  
D_mis 1 (0) if the CDS contract maturity is (is not) m years (m=3, 5, 7, 10). ∑jInd is 1 (0) 
if a firm is (is not) in industry j, based on 1-digit SIC codes. All other variables are defined 
in Table 3. 
 
 
